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BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, AND IGNORING TEXT
HENRY L. CHAMBERS, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much is made of how to interpret the Constitution.1  The Consti-
tution is foundational and its law is the highest law in the land.  Conse-
quently, interpreting the Constitution correctly is important, not only
so that the Constitution’s words are honored but so that its ideals are
honored.  Similar desires accompany the interpretation of other im-
portant documents.  Indeed, how a sacred text like the Bible is or can
be interpreted may shed light upon how the Constitution could be or
should be interpreted.2  This brief Essay considers how a particular
vision of Christian biblical interpretation can inform constitutional in-
terpretation.3  This Essay does not necessarily endorse the use of the
interpretive method presented.  Rather, it suggests merely that an in-
terpretive method that may be used to interpret one sacred text might
have resonance when considering the possibilities of interpreting an-
other arguably sacred text.
The method of biblical interpretation that I present has two core
components.  The first component focuses on using a small number
of principles and events to guide interpretation of the entire docu-
ment.  The teachings and ministry of Jesus Christ provide the princi-
ples for this  model of biblical interpretation.  That a particular set of
Copyright  2009 by Henry L. Chambers, Jr.
* Henry L. Chambers, Jr., University of Richmond School of Law.  The author thanks
George Somerville, Esq., for his extremely helpful comments.
1. Indeed, sitting Supreme Court Justices have written in some depth on constitu-
tional interpretation. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 5 (2005) (urging that
courts take account of constitutional goals of participatory democracy when interpreting
the Constitution); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRE-
TATION 3, 37–47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (promoting textualism and originalism as the
proper modes of constitutional interpretation).
2. The Bible referenced is the Christian Bible. See THE CATECHISM, reprinted in THE
BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 853 (1979) (“The Holy Scriptures, commonly called the Bible,
are the books of the Old and New Testaments; other books, called the Apocrypha, are
often included in the Bible.”); see also N. T. WRIGHT, SIMPLY CHRISTIAN 175–80 (2006) (dis-
cussing what books have historically been included in the Bible and those that have not).
For the purposes of this Essay, I will reference the New International Version of the Bible.
3. The form of interpretation is centered on Episcopalianism and Anglicanism, but is
not necessarily peculiar to that Christian denomination.
92
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principles would illuminate the whole of a document is not particu-
larly odd.  Given, however, that the life of Christ occurred well after
significant portions of the Bible were written, referencing Christ’s
ministry to interpret portions of a text that predates Christ may seem a
bit strange.  Nonetheless, the Old Testament  must be interpreted by
Christians through the lens of Christ’s ministry and teachings rather
than vice-versa.  The New Testament also must be interpreted in simi-
lar fashion, but without nearly the problems related to the sequencing
of events.4  Just as important, the interstices in the Bible must be filled
only with interpretations consistent with the principles of Christ’s
ministry.  The focus on Christ’s ministry leads to the second key com-
ponent.  The second component allows for ignoring biblical text that
is plainly inconsistent with the core principles of Christ’s ministry,
even when the text appears clear and even when the problematic text
was written before the core principles were developed.
As applied to the Constitution, the interpretive method suggested
above would take core constitutional principles and beliefs and place
them at the center of the interpretation of specific clauses of the Con-
stitution.  As explained below, the vision of equality largely, but not
fully, embodied in the Reconstruction Amendments would most likely
provide the core principles for constitutional interpretation.  Those
principles would be the mandatory lenses through which to view all
constitutional text.  The interstices of the Constitution, to the extent
that those interstices need to be filled, would need to be filled in a way
that is consistent with the equality principles embodied in the Recon-
struction Amendments.  Reading the Constitution through a small set
of principles may not be particularly revolutionary.5  The interpretive
method, however, would also suggest the willingness to ignore clear
4. Less troublesome sequencing problems exist with respect to the interpretation of
the New Testament.  For example, Saint Paul’s writings on the early church—which form a
substantial portion of the New Testament—reference a time after Jesus’ death, yet were
written before the Gospels detailing Jesus’ life and ministry were written. See JOHN SHELBY
SPONG, RESCUING THE BIBLE FROM FUNDAMENTALISM 80–83 (1991) (discussing the sequenc-
ing of the writing of the books of the New Testament); WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 177–78 R
(describing the uncertainty surrounding the times at which the books of the New Testa-
ment were written).  Consequently, we must take Gospels written later in time as the lenses
through which to interpret text written earlier in time.
5. Justice Breyer does not exalt any particular canon of interpretation.  Rather, he
suggests that one should consider the Constitution’s overarching theme—active liberty—
to interpret the Constitution’s text. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 6–7 (detailing Justice R
Breyer’s belief that active liberty is the key to understanding the Constitution).
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constitutional text that is inconsistent with those principles.  That may
be more than most are willing to consider.6
II. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION
Similarities between the Bible and the Constitution abound.7
The Bible is a constitution for Christians.  Its theology tells Christians
who they are, indicates how Christians should live, and states what
Christians should aspire to be.  Similarly, the Constitution is the con-
stitution for Americans.  It constitutes the United States as a nation
and reflects American aspirations.  Indeed, some would argue that the
Constitution reflects our civil religion.8
Both the Bible and the Constitution were written over time.  That
a document is written over time allows its adaptation to changing
times and places.  This is of particular import for the Bible and the
Constitution, both of which are historical documents that continue to
guide the lives of their adherents or those subject to their commands.
That documents contain text from various ages, however, can make
interpretation tricky.9  Rules applicable in one age can appear odd
when applied in a different age.10  Conversely, rules arguably can be
made somewhat timeless if interpreted through a limited, focused set
of principles.  This can be important particularly for documents, like
the Bible and the Constitution, that are used to evaluate and resolve
problems.
6. The palatability of rejecting text is not necessarily based on one’s political outlook.
See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 87–88 (1988) (noting that faithful interpret-
ers cannot reach just any conclusion they wish when constitutional commands are clear);
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 24 (1995) (“Sometimes, although rarely, the
words of the Constitution appear to speak for themselves.  In such circumstances the Con-
stitution does not seem to require interpretation.”); Scalia, supra note 1, at 37 (“In textual R
interpretation, context is everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us not to
expect nit-picking detail, and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than narrow
interpretation—though not an interpretation that the language will not bear.”); Laurence
H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 65, 65 (contending R
that when asking what a “legal text” means, one should generally refrain from inquiring
into the “ideas, intentions, or expectations subjectively held by whatever particular persons
were . . . involved in drafting, promulgating, or ratifying the text in question”).
7. See JAROSLAV PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION 2 (2004)
(noting the similarities between biblical and constitutional authority).
8. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 6, at 9–53 (offering an extensive historical and inter- R
pretive analogy of the Constitution as a sacred text).
9. See Tribe, supra note 6, at 83–84 (“Most fundamentally, a text that has a strong R
transtemporal extension cannot be read in the same way as, say, a statute or regulation
enacted at a given moment in time to deal with a specific problem.”).
10. See SPONG, supra note 4, at 77 (“So clearly, all of the words of the Bible are not the R
unchanging ‘Word of God.’  Practices that once were normative for the Bible have become
for us either illegal or, in some cases, immoral.”).
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The Bible and the Constitution are not merely documents.  Both
documents provide or structure ways of living.11  As texts for living,
what they mean is arguably more important than what they say.  Uni-
versal agreement exists regarding what the Constitution’s words are
and some agreement exists in the Christian world regarding the Bi-
ble’s words.12  Far less agreement exists regarding what the Constitu-
tion or the Bible mean.  How the documents are interpreted
determines what the texts mean, how they apply to specific situations,
and how those subject to their commands will live.  Of course, that
various people will interpret the documents guarantees that the docu-
ments will be interpreted in multiple ways.13
The Bible and the Constitution can be interpreted for at least two
different, but related, reasons.14  First, they can be interpreted to de-
termine how their adherents should generally live their lives.15  They
can provide general guidance to keep their adherents tethered to the
principles the documents espouse as those adherents go about their
lives.  In context, the documents may need to be interpreted to ensure
11. Arguably, the Old Testament alone provides a complete way of life:
During many centuries of Jewish history, as the historical books of the Old Testa-
ment describe it, the written authority of the Torah, either in creative interaction
with the living authority of the prophets or sometimes in tension with it, ordered
not only the religious and the liturgical life of the worshipping community, but
the morality, diet, and personal hygiene of individuals (as in the Book of Leviti-
cus) and the public and the political institutions of the entire nation (as in the
Book of Deuteronomy).
PELIKAN, supra note 7, at 16. R
12. Of course, the very process of translating the Bible included a substantial amount
of interpretation. See id. at 108–09 (noting that translation is a form of interpretation).
Consequently, biblical interpretation often is the interpretation of an interpretation.
13. Differing interpretations of any document can lead to discord among its adherents.
See LEVINSON, supra note 6, at 17.  Professor Levinson makes the following observation: R
[T]here is a double message contained within the analogy of the Constitution to a
sacred text or the Supreme Court to a holy institution.  The first, emphasizing
unity and integration, is the one with which we tend to be most familiar.  I pro-
pose here, however, to examine the alternative message, which is the potential of
a written constitution to serve as the source of fragmentation and disintegration.
Id.
14. Of course, the Bible and the Constitution are not to be interpreted for precisely
the same reasons. See PELIKAN, supra note 7, at 15 (noting that a fundamental difference R
between the Bible and the Constitution is “the Bible is meant to be prayed and believed,
and only therefore acted upon”).
15. How strictly the Bible should be used for guidance has varied among its adherents.
See CHRISTOPHER L. WEBBER, WELCOME TO THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH 47 (1999) (“At the time
of the Reformation some maintained that Christians should do only what Scripture directly
commanded, while others maintained that Christians could do anything except what the
Scriptures prohibited.”).
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that particular courses of conduct that are not mentioned in the texts
are generally consistent with constitutional or biblical principles.16
Second, the Bible and the Constitution may need to be inter-
preted to determine whether a specific course of conduct is prohib-
ited by the relevant document.17  In these situations, the Bible and the
Constitution may be sought to be used as codes.18  Interpreting the
documents for specific guidance regarding actual disputes that are
not already resolved in those texts, however, can put pressure on
those documents to do something they may not have been written to
do.  Though some parts of the Bible and the Constitution are arguably
structured as codes, both documents provide more principles than
rules.19  That the documents reflect standards more than rules means
that some behavior that appears to violate Christian principles or con-
stitutional principles may not violate specific textual prohibitions.
Nonetheless, a faithful interpretation of either document might re-
quire that resolutions deemed acceptable under either document
would need to be consistent with the core principles of the relevant
document.  The next Part notes one approach to biblical
interpretation.
III. CHRISTIAN BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION
A. The Primacy of Jesus’ Ministry
The Christian Bible is composed of the Old Testament and the
New Testament.  For Christians, the Old Testament covers the Old
Covenant that God had with his chosen people, the Hebrews.20  The
New Testament chronicles Jesus’ life and ministry and reveals the New
16. See ARTICLES OF RELIGION Art. XXXIV, reprinted in THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER
874 (1979) (noting that there can be diverse traditions and practices in various parts of the
church as long as none are contrary to God’s commands).
17. Of course, like any document, the Bible can be read in a self-serving fashion. See
SPONG, supra note 4, at 2 (describing self-serving attempts to read the Bible to justify or R
encourage segregation).
18. See PELIKAN, supra note 7, at 8 (explaining the application of both the Bible and the R
Constitution to present situations experienced by their adherents).
19. See Tribe, supra note 6, at 68 (noting that some of the Constitution’s clauses enact R
“fairly abstract principles” and others enact “quite concrete rules”); WEBBER, supra note 15, R
at 50 (“[T]he Bible is not a rule book . . . . The Bible is something quite different; we go to
it not to find specific words to answer our questions but to find the Word who created us
and knows our need before we ask.”); WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 186 (“The Bible does in- R
deed contain lists of rules (The Ten Commandments, for instance, in Exodus 20), but as it
stands, as a whole, it doesn’t consist of a list of dos and don’ts.”).
20. See THE CATECHISM, supra note 2, at 846 (“The Old Covenant is the one given by R
God to the Hebrew people.”).
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Covenant that Jesus brought to any who would become Christians.21
Biblical interpretation has always been controversial and is not easy.22
Indeed, Jesus’ import to Christians as the Messiah is based in large
part on the interpretation of the Old Testament’s discussion of the
coming of a messiah.23
Christ’s arrival, however, changed how the Bible is to be inter-
preted, at least by Christians.  Christian biblical interpretation occurs
through the lens of Christ’s ministry.24  Though all of the Bible was
inspired by God and is worthy of respect on its own, Jesus was the
incarnation of God.  His teachings are God’s teachings and must take
precedence over anything that is inconsistent with those teachings.25
Determining what Jesus is saying to us is, in effect, indistinguishable
from determining what God is saying to us.26  It is not that the remain-
der of the Bible is unimportant.27  It is that Jesus’ ministry is the distil-
lation of God’s word and, consequently, is special.28
21. See id. at 850 (“The New Covenant is the new relationship with God given by Jesus
Christ, the Messiah, to the apostles; and, through them, to all who believe in him.”).
22. Indeed, the possibility of multiple human interpretations of the Bible appears em-
bedded in the Episcopal Catechism. See id. at 853–54 (“We understand the meaning of the
Bible by the help of the Holy Spirit, who guides the Church in the true interpretation of
the Scriptures.”).
23. The Old Testament recognizes that a messiah will come.  A question, of course, is
whether that messiah has come already. See Jamie Cowen, Editorial, Affirming Messianic
Judaism, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 2009, at A13, available at http://
www2.timesdispatch.com/rtd/news/opinion/op_ed/article/RLCOWEN_20090122-
182708/186089 (describing author’s experience as a Messianic Jew); see generally DAN
COHN-SHERBOK, MESSIANIC JUDAISM (2000) (tracing the development of Messianic
Judaism).
24. See WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 224–25 (“There are rules, of course.  The New Testa- R
ment has plenty of them . . . . It isn’t so much that we lack clear rules; we lack, I fear, the
teaching that will draw attention to what is in fact there in our primary documents, not
least in the teaching of Jesus himself.”).
25. Though all parts of the Bible are said to be inspired by God, it is possible that some
words are more valuable than others, at least in biblical interpretation. See WEBBER, supra
note 15, at 53 (“[W]e need to understand that when the Prayer Book speaks of the Bible as R
the ‘rule and ultimate standard of faith,’ it does not mean that every word of the Bible
contains the same authority.”).
26. The primacy of Jesus’ words and ministry remain viscerally clear.  Indeed, many
Bibles continue the tradition of printing Jesus’ words in a different color than the remain-
der of the Bible’s text. See, e.g., SPONG, supra note 4, at 13 (noting that his childhood Bible R
printed Jesus’ words in red).
27. See THE CATECHISM, supra note 2, at 853 (“The Old Testament consists of books
written by the people of the Old Covenant, under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, to
show God at work in nature and history.”).
28. See WEBBER, supra note 15, at 66–67 (noting that Episcopal doctrine suggests that R
“God truly became a human being in the person of Jesus Christ” and that “[t]o say that
God became incarnate in Jesus Christ is to say that no fuller expression of God’s love for us
and will for us can be given”).
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The primacy of Christ’s ministry is particularly important to
Christians.29  To the extent that Christ’s ministry was in many respects
the fulfillment of the Old Testament, the Old Testament is largely
consistent with Christ’s ministry.30  Interpretations of the Old Testa-
ment must be consistent with or must be made consistent with Christ’s
ministry.  To the extent that the New Testament breaks with Old Tes-
tament teaching and interpretation, the parts of and practices in the
Old Testament that are fundamentally inconsistent with Christ’s
teaching can be ignored.31  Similarly, interpretations of the New Tes-
tament—which begins with Christ’s ministry and includes teachings of
the early Christian church—must be consistent with Christ’s
ministry.32
Of course, non-Christians need not consider Christ’s ministry to
be anything more than persuasive or not so persuasive discussion of
Old Testament writings.  They can interpret the Old Testament in the
same way as they would in the absence of Christ’s ministry or can treat
the Old Testament as primary and Christ’s teaching as secondary,
such that any inconsistency between Christ’s teaching and the Old
Testament can be resolved in favor of the Old Testament’s text.  In-
29. See WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 92 (“Christianity is all about the belief that the living R
God, in fulfillment of his promises and as the climax of the story of Israel, has accom-
plished all this—the finding, the saving, the giving of new life—in Jesus.”).
30. See Matthew 5:17–20 (New International Version).  The Gospel of Matthew contains
the following:
Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not
come to abolish them but to fulfill them.  I tell you the truth, until heaven and
earth disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any
means disappear from the Law until everything is accomplished.  Anyone who
breaks one of the least of these commandments and teaches others to do the
same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever practices and
teaches these commands will be called great in the kingdom of heaven.  For I tell
you that unless your righteousness surpasses that of the Pharisees and the teach-
ers of the law, you will certainly not enter the kingdom of heaven.
Id.; ARTICLES OF RELIGION Art. VII, reprinted in THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 869 (1979)
(“The Old Testament is not contrary to the New: for both in the Old and New Testament
everlasting life is offered to Mankind by Christ, who is the only Mediator between God and
Man, being both God and Man.”).
31. See ARTICLES OF RELIGION Art. VII, supra note 30, at 869.  The Article advises the R
following:
Although the Law given from God by Moses, as touching Ceremonies and Rites,
do not bind Christian men, nor the Civil precepts thereof ought of necessity to be
received in any commonwealth; yet notwithstanding, no Christian man whatso-
ever is free from the obedience of the Commandments which are called Moral.
Id.
32. See THE CATECHISM, supra note 2, at 853 (“The New Testament consists of books R
written by the people of the New Covenant, under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, to set
forth the life and teachings of Jesus and to proclaim the Good News of the Kingdom for all
people.”).
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deed, for those who believe the Old Testament to be the unerring
word of God, attempts to reinterpret or ignore parts of it merely in
light of Jesus Christ’s ministry could be viewed as heretical.  This view-
point is consistent with not being a Christian, but does not necessarily
require any hostility toward Christianity.  Though both a Christian
and non-Christian interpretation of the Bible can coexist and lead to
similar conclusions regarding how we should live our lives, it may do
so purely through happenstance.
Interpreting the Bible through Christ’s ministry is not as simple
as it sounds.  Christ was not always clear in his teachings.  Nonetheless,
at a general level, Christ provides a simple lens through which to di-
vine the Bible’s meaning.  Bible passages are read through the lens of
Jesus Christ’s ministry that is thought by Episcopalians to focus on two
key commandments that constitute what is known as the Summary of
the Law: “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all
your soul, and with all your mind.  This is the first and the great com-
mandment.  And the second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as
yourself.”33  From this simple command, a Christian interpretation of
the Bible can begin.  Using this command to interpret the Bible in a
traditionally Anglican or Episcopal manner requires that faithful in-
terpreters take Christ’s teaching, language of the Scriptures, the tradi-
tions of the Anglican Church, and their own reason and intellect to
discern the Bible’s meaning.34  If, in that process, some of the clear
language of the Scriptures must be ignored, so be it.35
B. Ignoring Text
One can posit ignoring biblical text.36  If, however, the obligation
of Christians is to reconcile Jesus’ teachings with all parts of the Bible,
it is possible that no text will be jettisoned.  Some of the most serious
intra-denominational and interdenominational battles in Christianity
supposedly focus on which side has faithfully interpreted biblical text.
Regardless of the posturing, however, it is fair to say that when a part
33. Id. at 851.
34. See WEBBER, supra note 15, at 70 (“Anglicans have . . . appealed to Scripture, tradi- R
tion, and reason as the basis on which to build an understanding of God.”).
35. See id. at 48 (“Sometimes Jesus himself overrode scriptural commandments with
new commands, as in the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5:21–48).”).
36. Some have even suggested that biblical text can be so troublesome that in parts, it
may not fundamentally reflect God at all. See SPONG, supra note 4, at ix (noting speech in R
which the author “had raised questions about how we Christians could continue to call the
Bible the Word of God when many of its passages reflected facts that twentieth-century
Christians simply do not acknowledge as true and attitudes that twentieth-century Chris-
tians do not share”).
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of the Bible appears to be impossible to reconcile with principles of
Christ’s ministry, it has to be reinterpreted out of existence or simply
ignored.  This includes parts of the Old Testament and the New Testa-
ment, both of which are nevertheless considered by Episcopalians to
be the work of humans inspired by God.37  No matter how orthodox a
Christian group claims to be, parts of the Old Testament will be ig-
nored.  This is clear in a recent dispute between groups in the Episco-
pal Church.  Though one side claims to read the Word more faithfully
than the other side, both sides forswear some of the Bible’s text.
1. The Legal Case
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that courts are
not supposed to become involved in disputes regarding religious doc-
trine and orthodoxy.38  When ecclesiastical matters are important to
resolving a case, however, courts may be required to intervene even as
they claim to avoid such entanglements.  The Virginia state courts
have been enlisted to resolve a dispute between the Episcopal Diocese
of Virginia (“Diocese”) and a group of breakaway congregations that
have declared themselves separate from the Diocese.39  Whether the
breakaway group can leave the Diocese is not the key dispute.  The
key dispute is whether the breakaway parishes can keep the church
property that both they and the Diocese claim to own.40  Though the
Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, has claimed that the prop-
erty issue is not related to doctrine,41 the case arguably already has
spawned an issue of doctrine and orthodoxy.
37. See THE CATECHISM, supra note 2, at 853 (noting that the Bible is called “the Word
of God because God inspired their human authors and because God still speaks to us
through the Bible”).
38. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (observing that courts are prohib-
ited from resolving church disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice) (cita-
tions omitted).
39. The legal case is detailed in Letter Opinion on the Constitutionality of Va. Code
§ 57-9(A), In Re: Multi-Circuit Episcopal Church Prop. Litig., CL 2007-0248724, 2008 Va.
Cir. LEXIS 85 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 27, 2008), and Letter Opinion on the Applicability of Va.
Code § 57-9(A), In Re: Multi-Circuit Episcopal Church Prop. Litig., CL 2007-0248724, 2008
Va. Cir. LEXIS 22 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 3, 2008).  For a thorough collection of news and
documents related to the trial and appellate phases of this litigation, see http://
www.thediocese.net/News_services/property.shtml.
40. See Episcopal Church Prop. Litig., 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 22, at *78–80 (outlining the
procedural history of the case, which arose out of a complaint against the breakaway minis-
tries for trespass, conversion, and illegal alienation of church property).
41. See Episcopal Church Prop. Litig., 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 85, at *69–86 (rejecting an
argument that the statutory provision requires the court to decide religious questions).
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The circuit court has focused on determining how a particular
Virginia statute, Code of Virginia Section 57-9,42 applies to the dis-
pute.43  The statute allows congregations that decide between belong-
ing to two branches of the same church to make that choice and
retain parish property.44  In one of its rulings, the court determined
that it could apply the statute to the litigation without determining
matters of church doctrine.45  Consequently, the court ruled that the
statute is not unconstitutional on its face.46
Though the circuit court was adamant in its stance that it would
not have to decide church doctrine issues, it almost certainly is incor-
rect.  The statute at issue arguably is not applicable unless the congre-
gations have a choice in deciding which church to join.47  The
Episcopal Church of the United States of America (“ECUSA”) is a hi-
erarchical and territory-based church.48  It is recognized as the
Anglican Communion’s church in the United States, and the Diocese
of Virginia is the ECUSA’s recognized diocese for the localities where
the breakaway parishes are located.49  Consequently, it is possible that
there is no cognizable choice regarding which branch of the Episco-
pal Church a parish wishes to join.50  That is, until the ECUSA ceases
to be the Anglican Communion’s recognized church in the United
States or until the Diocese of Virginia ceases to be the ECUSA’s dio-
cese for the covered territory, a choice to leave the Diocese and associ-
ate with another group is not a choice between two branches of the
same church, but a decision to leave the Episcopal Church.  From a
doctrinal perspective, choosing to leave the Diocese of Virginia to join
another Anglican group may be akin to joining a different denomina-
tion entirely, even if the other Anglican group has ties with the world-
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9 (2007).
43. See supra note 39. R
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9.
45. Episcopal Church Prop. Litig., 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 85, at *69–86.
46. Id. at *93.
47. See In Re: Multi-Circuit Episcopal Church Prop. Litig., CL 2007-0248724, 2008 Va.
Cir. LEXIS 22, at *87–88 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 3, 2008) (explaining the Episcopal Church and
Diocese’s argument that the statute would not apply until the church’s hierarchy had itself
recognized a “division”).
48. See id. at *8–21 (outlining the structure of the church and Diocese).
49. Id. at *8–10.
50. See id. at *87–88 (“Because the governing authorities of the ECUSA/Diocese have
not acknowledged the occurrence of a division, the ECUSA/Diocese argue that there is no
division here under 57-9(A).”) (italics in original).  The church and Diocese have contin-
ued to advance this argument in briefs filed before the Supreme Court of Virginia.  See,
e.g., Petition for Appeal at 10–24, Episcopal Church v. Truro Church, No. 090683 (Va. Apr.
7, 2009), available at http://www.thediocese.net/News_services/property_appellate.shtml.
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wide Anglican Communion.51  This is not necessarily the only way to
interpret ECUSA doctrine, but coming to a different conclusion
would seem to require the reinterpretation of church doctrine.
Apart from the issue of whether the breakaway parishes are leav-
ing the ECUSA is whether the breakaway parishes are, in choosing to
align with other organizations, joining organizations that are the true
heirs of the Anglican tradition.  The breakaway parishes believe that
the organizations that they are joining are maintaining orthodox
Anglican thought and that the ECUSA has abandoned orthodoxy to
the point that it has left the Anglican fold.52  Understandably, this is
an issue that courts do not want to decide and appear unable to de-
cide under United States Supreme Court doctrine.53  Which entity—
the ECUSA or the organizations joined by the breakaway parishes—is
the true repository of Anglican orthodoxy in the United States is im-
portant, however.  That issue, as illuminated in large part through the
debate about the role of gay people in the church and to a lesser
extent the role of women in the church, is the core of the dispute
between the ECUSA and the breakaway parishes.54  It is more central
to the real issue underlying the breakup than the issues the courts are
willing to decide. The issue relates to biblical interpretation.
2. Orthodoxy and Ignoring Text
A core issue in the dispute between the breakaway parishes and
the Diocese of Virginia/ECUSA is the role of gay people in the
church.55  In 2003, the General Convention of the ECUSA approved
the Diocese of New Hampshire’s decision to elect the Reverend V.
Gene Robinson, a non-celibate gay man, bishop.56  This decision is
not the only one on which the breakaway parishes differ from the Dio-
51. See Petition for Appeal, supra note 50, at 19–22 (arguing that the breakaway congre- R
gations have not joined a “branch” of the Episcopal Church and Diocese).
52. See Episcopal Church Prop. Litig., 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 22, at *21–78 (detailing the
doctrinal clash leading to the separation); id. at *80–87 (outlining the congregations’ argu-
ment that a “division” had occurred within the meaning of the statute).
53. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. R
54. See Episcopal Church Prop. Litig., 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 22, at *22–29 (identifying this
shift as the “[g]enesis of the [c]onflict”).
55. This issue is not new. See DAVID L. HOLMES, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EPISCOPAL
CHURCH 170–71 (1993) (discussing church disputes stretching back to the 1970s about the
place of gays in the church).
56. See ELIZABETH ADAMS, GOING TO HEAVEN: THE LIFE AND ELECTION OF BISHOP GENE
ROBINSON 4–5 (2006); Jonathan Finer, Episcopalians Consecrate First Openly Gay Bishop, WASH.
POST, Nov. 3, 2003, at A1 (chronicling Bishop V. Gene Robinson’s installation).
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cese/ECUSA.57  It is, however, a major decision that could be thought
to have been the final dispute that guaranteed the eventual break.
At the center of the dispute about the role of gays in the church is
the interpretation of Scripture.  The two groups appear to interpret
the Bible differently.  The Old Testament book Leviticus condemns
homosexual behavior and adultery as sinful and as cause for the death
of participants in such activity.58  New Testament language mentions
homosexuality and calls generally for abstention from sexual immoral-
ity.59  What this and similar language means for today is at the heart of
the dispute between the groups.  Of course, neither group takes all of
this language literally.
The breakaway parishes tend to view the language in the Bible
regarding homosexuality as the last word on the appropriateness of
elevating gays to positions of authority in the church.60  Biblical lan-
guage that suggests that homosexual activity is sinful arguably suggests
that those who engage in such behavior openly and without the recog-
nition of its sinfulness are not fit to serve as bishops in God’s church.
According to the breakaway parishes, those who do not read the bibli-
cal passages similarly are literally unorthodox.61  The refusal of the
ECUSA to read a number of other biblical passages in a similar fash-
ion marks the ECUSA, according to the breakaway parishes, as unor-
thodox and an inappropriate receptacle for Anglican authority in the
57. See HOLMES, supra note 55, at 167–70 (noting fractures in the Episcopal church R
regarding the ordination of women); Jamie Deal, Schism on the Horizon, WKLY. STANDARD,
Jul. 5, 2006, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/
000/012/397abmpd.asp (discussing the possible fallout from ECUSA’s 2006 selection of
Katharine Jefferts Schori as its first female presiding bishop).
58. See Leviticus 18:22 (New International Version) (“‘Do not lie with a man as one lies
with a woman; that is detestable.’”); Leviticus 20:10 (New International Version) (“‘If a
man commits adultery with another man’s wife—with the wife of his neighbor—both the
adulterer and the adulteress must be put to death.’”); Leviticus 20:13 (New International
Version) (“‘If a man lies with a man as one lies with a woman, both of them have done
what is detestable.  They must be put to death; their blood will be on their own heads.’”).
59. See, e.g., Acts 15:29 (New International Version) (suggesting abstention from sexual
immorality); Romans 1:26–32 (New International Version) (noting many sinful activities
including various sexual activities).
60. See Al Webb, Anglican Schism Feared over Gays Archbishop Cautions Clerics, WASH.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2005, at A1 (noting a citation to the literal language of Leviticus as the
source of conservative opposition to the shift within the Episcopal Church).  For a discus-
sion of the rancor accompanying discussion of the role of gays in the Episcopal Church
and other denominations, see ADAMS, supra note 56, at 113–18. R
61. See Al Webb, Anglican Schism Feared over Gays Archbishop Cautions Clerics, supra note
60. R
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United States.62  It is clear that the breakaway parishes believe they are
reading passages through the lens of Christ’s ministry.
Not surprisingly, those who tend to support the decision of the
ECUSA General Convention with respect to Bishop Robinson tend to
view the Bible passages differently.63  They tend to read the passages
in context and through their vision of Jesus Christ’s ministry.  That is,
the passages most widely cited by the dissenters to support a limited
role for gays in today’s Episcopal Church tend to be in close proximity
to passages that condemn behavior that would never be considered
justifiable reasons to limit the role of those engaging in such behavior
in today’s Episcopal Church.64
Whether the breakaway parishes are correct or whether the
ECUSA is correct about the proper role of gay people in the church is
not important to this Essay.  What is important is the fact that neither
group is willing to take the Bible at its literal word.65  The question
both groups consider is not whether to ignore some parts of the Scrip-
62. The role of women in the church is also a problematic issue for the breakaway
parishes.  Some New Testament language suggests a very small role for women in the
Church. See 1 Corinthians 14:34–35 (New International Version) (noting that women
ought not speak in church); see also SPONG, supra note 4, at 5–6 (expanding on the pas- R
sage).  Though some in the breakaway groups do not see women as able to hold the same
positions of authority in churches as men can, it is not clear that they take the fully “ortho-
dox” position that women should simply be quiet in church.  Even the Church of England,
the mother of Anglicanism, has approved the consecration of women as bishops. Women
Bishops Approved by Church of England’s General Synod, EPISCOPAL LIFE ONLINE, July 8, 2008,
available at http://www.episcopalchurch.org/79901_98698_ENG_HTM.htm.
63. Of course, the Anglican Church itself was created in part because of disagreements
about biblical interpretations. See HOLMES, supra note 55, at 179–94 (detailing the dispute R
regarding Henry VIII’s inability to receive an annulment of his marriage to Catherine of
Aragon, resulting in the formation of the Anglican Church).
64. See, e.g., Leviticus 19:19 (New International Version) (prohibiting the planting of
two kinds of seed in the same field); Leviticus 19:27 (New International Version) (concern-
ing the cutting of one’s hair and beard).  Though some might claim that Leviticus 19 does
not state the prohibitions in that chapter as strongly as the prohibitions against homosexu-
ality in Leviticus 20, Leviticus 19 includes commandment-level admonitions such as do not
steal and do not lie. See Leviticus 19:11 (New International Version).  This would suggest
that the violation of any of the admonitions in the chapter would be sinful.  Of course,
Leviticus 20 includes admonitions about sexual activity and infidelity that might leave some
Episcopal priests in deep theological trouble. See, e.g., Leviticus 20:10 (New International
Version) (prohibiting adultery under penalty of death); Leviticus 20:18 (New International
Version) (prohibiting intercourse during menstruation under penalty of banishment).
New Testament passages often speak generally about sexual immorality and other sinful
behavior rather than solely about homosexuality. See, e.g., Acts 15:23–29 (New International
Version) (including dietary restrictions with sexual restrictions); Romans 1:28–32 (New In-
ternational Version) (noting a wide variety of sinful behavior unrelated to homosexuality).
65. Rebellious children should rejoice. See WEBBER, supra note 15, at 48 (“The [Bi- R
ble’s] . . . instructions . . . to stone a disobedient son (Deuteronomy 21:18–21) should give
us pause in simply quoting the Bible to justify our actions.”).
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tures, but which passages to ignore and precisely how to ignore them.
Both the ECUSA and the breakaway parishes ignore aspects of the
implications of the Levitican prohibition on homosexuality.66  Simi-
larly, both groups ignore the prohibitions in Leviticus regarding be-
havior neither group views as sinful.67  Both groups would claim to be
orthodox in their reading of the Bible, and that is the point.  Ignoring
text that does not fit with Christ’s ministry is not terribly problematic
under the Christian model of biblical interpretation posited here.68
IV. CHRISTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. The Primacy of the Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments
With respect to the Constitution, the Civil War and the Recon-
struction Amendments passed in its wake are the most salient compa-
rators to Jesus’ life and ministry.  The Civil War is probably the most
traumatic and transformative event the nation has endured.  Indeed,
it was the deadliest war the United States has ever suffered.69  Its mem-
ory continues to haunt us and inspire scholarship.  That the Civil War
tore the nation and its governing structure apart at a fundamental
level explains why it must be considered the seminal event in Ameri-
can constitutional history.  The Civil War and its aftermath was similar
in effect to Christ’s coming in that for many it challenged and
changed the rules of society while rebuilding that society on a similar,
but somewhat different, foundation.  To some, the Civil War altered
the trajectory of the Constitution.  For others, the post-Civil War Con-
stitution is completely different than the pre-Civil War Constitution.70
66. It is doubtful that the breakaway parishes would espouse the command of Leviticus
20:13 to put homosexuals to death.
67. It is doubtful that either the Diocese or breakaway parishes view the wearing of
clothing that blend wool and linen to be sinful. See Leviticus 19:19 (New International
Version) (“‘Do not wear clothing woven of two kinds of material.’”).
68. See SPONG, supra note 4, at 6.  Bishop Spong discusses biblical limitations on the R
participation of women in church:
If this passage is taken literally, if the Bible is regarded as the “inerrant word of
God,” then no woman can sing in a choir, participate in a liturgy, teach Sunday
school, or be ordained as a pastor or a priest.  Churches with women participating
in any of these areas, and that includes every church in Christendom on some
level, have thus ignored, reinterpreted, dismissed, or relativized these biblical
passages.
Id.
69. See GARRET EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN 19 (2006) (observing that the Civil War was “a
holocaust that consumed the lives of 620,000 men in uniform . . . and that count is woefully
incomplete”).
70. See LEVINSON, supra note 6, at 139 (“The conflict of 1861, among other things, di- R
vides our constitutional history, and some historians refer to the ‘first’ and ‘second’ Consti-
tutions.  The first Constitution—that of 1787—was predicated, among other things, on
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Even though much of the text of the pre-Civil War Constitution sur-
vived unaltered, the implications flowing from that language signifi-
cantly changed.71  The post-Civil War Constitution looks at people,
citizens, the states, and the nation differently than the pre-Civil War
Constitution did.72
If the Civil War can be likened to Christ’s coming, the Recon-
struction Amendments—the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments of the Constitution—can be analogized to Christ’s min-
istry and teaching.  Ultimately the Union was stitched back together
through the Reconstruction Amendments.  The Thirteenth Amend-
ment abolished slavery.73  The Fourteenth Amendment, inter alia,
made former slaves and their progeny citizens and required that they
be provided the equal protection of the laws.74  The Fifteenth Amend-
ment outlawed denying the right to vote based on race.75  Through
their language and subsequent interpretation, the Reconstruction
Amendments introduced a formal equality that created a single mass
of equal citizens who were all to be given the same legal and civil
rights under the Constitution.  Though the language of the Recon-
struction Amendments only appears to provide explicitly for the full
equality of former male slaves given its language with respect to suf-
frage, its principles suggest an equality of citizenship the breadth of
which had never been seen in the United States.76
In similar fashion, the Reconstruction Amendments transformed
and realigned the role and prerogatives of states in the federal system.
The states remained sovereign in some respects.  However, their role
federalism and recognition of slavery; the second Constitution, on an enhanced national
government and individual liberty.”); Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of
the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (“[T]he Constitution did not
[survive the Civil War].  In its place arose a new, more promising basis for justice and
equality, the fourteenth amendment, ensuring protection of the life, liberty, and property
of all persons against deprivations without due process, and guaranteeing equal protection
of the laws.”).
71. Arguably this is no surprise. See Tribe, supra note 6, at 86 (noting that in the wake R
of constitutional amendment, “constitutional provisions sometimes acquire new meanings
by the very process of formal amendment to other parts of the Constitution, even when the
words contained in the provision at issue remain unchanged and when only surrounding
text has been altered”).
72. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment’s Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L.
REV. 47, 101 (1995) (noting the audacity and breadth of the Fourteenth Amendment).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
76. Whether the promise of the language has truly been fulfilled is unclear. See Eis-
gruber, supra note 72, at 75–98 (examining instances of the Court’s failure to recognize R
the full impact of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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as subservient to, rather than co-equal with, the Union was unques-
tioned in the wake of the Reconstruction Amendments.  The Four-
teenth Amendment limited states in their prerogatives regarding how
to treat their citizens.  The requirement of equal protection to all citi-
zens and the eventual incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights into
the Fourteenth Amendment significantly changed the relationship of
states to their citizens and limited the state’s traditional power to deny
equality to certain groups of people subject to the state’s jurisdiction.
Rather than accept governmental prerogative that allowed govern-
ments to choose favorites among groups of citizens, the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments demanded equality for citizens with respect to legal
rights.77
The Reconstruction Amendments can be considered a partial ful-
fillment of the equality principles presented in the Declaration of In-
dependence and the pre-Civil War Constitution, or a complete break
with the past.78  The Reconstruction Amendments can be viewed as
the fulfillment of equality principles already existent in the American
traditions if the Amendments are viewed merely as expanding equality
to all those who should always have been considered citizens and to
those subject to United States jurisdiction.  Conversely, one can argue
that the Reconstruction Amendments were a significant break from
the past because the limited equality in the founding documents sug-
gested a cramped view of equality that is completely different than the
post-Civil War vision of equality.79
At the very least, the Reconstruction Amendments were a break
from the past as embodied by Dred Scott v. Sandford80 and all that the
77. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Retooling the Intent Requirement Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 611, 611–12 (2004) (asserting that the Four-
teenth Amendment, under modern interpretations, “appears to require evenhandedness
whenever the government acts” (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 439 (1985))).
78. Even the Reconstruction Amendments did not fully deliver equality. See Henry L.
Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1405–07
(2002) (explaining that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments provided for a nar-
row set of legal rights, but did not include voting rights or other key civil rights); LEVINSON,
supra note 6, at 189 (noting the 1868 Constitution’s failure to guarantee voting rights for R
women).
79. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 11 (noting that the Warren Court “consider[ed] how R
the Civil War amendments (and later amendments) had changed the scope of pre-Civil
War constitutional language, that is, by changing the assumptions, premises, or presupposi-
tions upon which many earlier constitutional interpretations had rested”); LEVINSON, supra
note 6, at 140 (“There can be little doubt that the so-called Civil War Amendments—the R
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments—partake of at least a limited constitu-
tional revolution.”).
80. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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pre-Civil War Constitution’s acceptance of slavery and the Slave Power
represented.81  However viewed, the principles of equality hinted at in
our founding documents have been largely fulfilled in the fullness of
time and subsequent interpretation of the Constitution.82  Whether
one views the Reconstruction Amendments as the fulfillment, distilla-
tion, or destruction of what went before, they are the fundamental
bases on which the American polity is now based.  To the extent that
the Constitution can be viewed through a particular set of principles,
the equality principles underlying the Reconstruction Amendments—
the full equality of citizens and relative equality of non-citizens—
would be the most reasonable lenses through which to interpret the
Constitution.83
B. Filling Interstices and Ignoring Constitutional Text
Interpreting the Constitution through a small set of principles is
not an odd concept.  Attempting to bring coherence to the Constitu-
tion is sensible, given that the Constitution and constitutions exist for
a general purpose.84  There may be differences of opinion regarding
81. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 294 (1998).  Professor Amar observes the
following:
But the Reconstruction [Fourteenth] Amendment did begin with an affirmation
of the freedom, and citizenship, of all.  Those who birthed it renounced the Slave
Power and all its works.  These midwives were women alongside men, blacks
alongside whites.  After their mighty labors, more work did remain to be done—
more work always remains to be done, if all are to be free and equal.  But because
of these men and women, our Bill of Rights was reborn.
Id.  For discussions of the Slave Power, see generally DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE SLAVE POWER
CONSPIRACY AND THE PARANOID STYLE (1969); LEONARD C. RICHARD, THE SLAVE POWER: THE
FREE NORTH AND SOUTHERN DOMINATION 1780–1860 (2000).
82. See generally Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Dred Scott: Tiered Citizenship and Tiered Per-
sonhood, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209 (2007) (discussing the Reconstruction Amendments’
reversal of Dred Scott’s endorsement of “tiered” citizenship and personhood).
83. See PELIKAN, supra note 7, at 22 (noting the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend- R
ments and the Equal Protection Clause as key clauses in interpreting in the Constitution).
Some might choose somewhat different principles as the lenses. See BREYER, supra note 1, R
at 5 (“My thesis is that courts should take greater account of the Constitution’s democratic
nature when they interpret constitutional and statutory texts.”); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 13 (2006) (“It is regrettable that law professors rarely teach
and that courts rarely cite the Preamble, for it is the single most important part of the Constitu-
tion . . . . It is indeed the ends articulated in the Preamble that justify the means of our
political institutions.”).
84. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 6.  Justice Breyer explains this view: R
[M]y thesis . . . finds in the Constitution’s democratic objective not simply re-
straint on judicial power or an ancient counterpart of more modern protection,
but also a source of judicial authority and an interpretive aid to more effective
protection of ancient and modern liberty alike.  It finds a basic perspective that
helps make sense of our Constitution’s structure, illuminating aspects that other-
wise seem less coherent.
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what set of principles ought to be chosen and what the Constitution’s
general purpose is, but there is a legitimacy to attempting to read the
document holistically with overarching principles providing interpre-
tive help.85  Of course, some may argue that constitutional interpreta-
tion is merely about reading clauses to determine what they mean.86
When care is not taken, however, particularly when phrases appear
clear, interpreting the phrases can mean little more than determining
what they say rather than what they mean.87  Overarching principles
may be necessary to apply a clause properly when the clause is to be
used to support a policy goal.88  This is standard constitutional
interpretation.
Filling the interstices of the Constitution with interpretations con-
sistent with the Reconstruction Amendments’ overarching principles
is also sensible.  Ignoring prior case law while filling any interstices
that exist in constitutional text, including the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, may be necessary or appropriate.89  This might upset those
Id.  The Preamble to the Constitution may also qualify as giving a purpose to the Constitu-
tion. See LEVINSON, supra note 83, at 13 (“In any event, I am happy to endorse the Pream- R
ble as the equivalent of our creedal summary of America’s civil religion.”).
85. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 115 (viewing the Constitution “as a single document R
designed to further certain basic general purposes as a whole”); see also LEVINSON, supra
note 6, at 150 (“The main body of [Walter] Murphy’s argument contends that the Consti-
tution is essentially oriented around the value of protecting human dignity.  This constitu-
tionalism is an important limit to the value of majority rule precisely because it incarnates a
value hierarchically superior to majority rule.”).
86. This view tends to lose salience fairly quickly, however. See POST, supra note 6, at 25 R
(“[I]f for any reason that [constitutional] meaning has become questionable, it is no help
at all to instruct a judge to follow the ‘plain meaning’ of the constitutional text.  A meaning
that has ceased to be plain cannot be made so by sheer force of will.”).
87. This also commonly arises in biblical interpretation:
[W]hen we find the Bible saying, “An eye for an eye and a tooth for tooth,” we
can read it as a bloodthirsty law to be ignored (which makes large parts of the
Bible irrelevant), an unchanging standard to be enforced in our modern penal
code (which puts us back to a pre-Christian world), or we can learn through fur-
ther study that this command was a step forward for a world whose usual rule was
unlimited vengeance (e.g., a life for an eye), and that it was a rule superseded in
its turn by Jesus’ injunction to turn the other cheek (Matthew 5:39).
WEBBER, supra note 15, at 48–49. R
88. See POST, supra note 6, at 25 (“If the [constitutional meaning of a clause is not R
plain], the question of constitutional meaning cannot be resolved by staring harder at the
ten words of the clause.  What is required instead is a means of interpreting the text so as
to mediate between the clause and its application.”).
89. Filling interstices with principles rather than judge-made precedent may be sensi-
ble. See Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 95, R
107–08 (noting that when faced with gaps in the Constitution, American judges’ “instinct
was to fill gaps or ambiguities in the text (statutory or constitutional) with judge-made
common law, rather than to search first, as a civil lawyer would, for guiding principles in
the structure and design of the instrument”).  Of course, precedent may have its place:
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who claim the primacy of settled constitutional meaning as ultimate
constitutional meaning, but so be it.90  Consider how the intent to
discriminate under the Fourteenth Amendment ought to be treated
under the posited vision of constitutional interpretation.91  The Four-
teenth Amendment is silent regarding whether the intent to discrimi-
nate is necessary for its own violation.  In interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment to determine whether its violation requires the intent to
discriminate, a court applying the mode of interpretation suggested
above would ask whether the known principles of the Reconstruction
Amendments illuminate whether the Fourteenth Amendment should
be interpreted to require the intent to discriminate.92  In taking this
approach to the Fourteenth Amendment violation, it is possible that
the intent to discriminate would not be required for a constitutional
violation to occur.93
Filling interstices with material consistent with core principles is
reasonable once the principles are identified.94  Christian constitu-
Both the history of the American Republic and the history of the Christian
Church make it clear that, alongside the authority of their original charters and
in continuous interaction with that authority, the ongoing and cumulative inter-
pretations of the Great Code in the form of tradition and precedent have come to
occupy a privileged position of authority in their own right.
PELIKAN, supra note 7, at 115. R
90. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 39–42 (criticizing the evolution of constitutional mean- R
ing from age to age).
91. See WEBBER, supra note 15, at 48 (“The Anglican position . . . is that we should R
require no beliefs except what we are persuaded can be solidly based on the Scriptures, but
we are free to adopt beliefs and customs that seem consistent with scriptural witness even
though they may not be directly stated.”).
92. A self-reference to the Fourteenth Amendment’s principles in determining its
meaning is simply an attempt to determine its scope.  It is little different from the attempts
to determine the Second Amendment’s scope through its introductory clause. See U.S.
CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”); District of Colum-
bia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789–90, 2799–802 (2008) (examining the effect of the
Amendment’s opening clause).
93. See Chambers, supra note 78, at 1414–15 (discussing discriminatory intent under R
the Fourteenth Amendment).
94. Filling interstices or areas of uncertainty can lead to results that may appear to
contradict the received meaning of text.  Laurence H. Tribe makes the following
argument:
Like nearly everyone, I agree, for instance, that the Supreme Court’s 1954 deci-
sion that official school segregation by race violates equal protection correctly
interprets what the Fourteenth Amendment says (and always said)—even though
it may well defy what the amendment’s authors and ratifiers expected the amend-
ment to do—and indeed I agree that the authors and ratifiers themselves may
well have intended to enact a provision that might, in light of its broad language
and its uncertain reach, end up condemning some of what they then regarded as
entirely just and proper.
Tribe, supra note 6, at 68. R
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tional interpretation would go further.  As text gets clearer, the prob-
lem of text clashing with principles becomes starker and more
problematic.95  Some may be troubled by text losing out to princi-
ples.96  However, if the principles and purposes of the Constitution
are frustrated because the constitutional text or understandings have
been overtaken by subsequent events, such as the Civil War, it may be
worthwhile to revisit even the clearest constitutional text to determine
if it must still mean what it seems to mean or seemed to have meant in
the past.97  That is, even when the text can be made to appear clear or
is clear, it may be worthwhile to reconsider it in context if it is going to
be applied as a rule of decision.
Given the tension between American constitutionalism before
the Civil War and American constitutionalism after the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments, some of the principles underlying the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments may conflict with some constitutional text.  The
question is what that means for constitutional interpretation.  The an-
swer may be that the principles underlying the Reconstruction
Amendments are so fundamental to the constitutional order that they
must prevail over contrary text.  If so, constitutional text that is incon-
sistent with the Reconstruction Amendments’ principles would need
to be reinterpreted to be consistent with the Reconstruction Amend-
ments or be ignored.  Under the constitutional interpretation noted
above, the principles underlying the Reconstruction Amendments
would not merely be some of a number of principles that should illu-
minate constitutional interpretation.  They would be the primary prin-
ciples that must illuminate constitutional interpretation.
Consequently, in reviewing constitutional text, the existence of clear
constitutional text would not mean that the text would be used to
make actual decisions. The words would not be literally excised from
95. See PELIKAN, supra note 7, at 76–78 (noting that whether the spirit of a document R
ought to prevail over the letter of a text when the spirit and letter of the text appear
inconsistent is a constant problem in interpreting texts).
96. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 46 (“For the evolutionist, on the other hand, every ques- R
tion is an open question, every day a new day.  No fewer than three of the Justices with
whom I have served have maintained that the death penalty is unconstitutional, even though
its use is explicitly contemplated in the Constitution.”).
97. The need to reconsider what prior written text really means in light of subsequent
developments also occurs in the biblical context:
[T]his New Testament precedent of interpreting prophecy in the light of subse-
quent history was the foundation for the ongoing exegetical task.  It required
considerably less specificity to move from this belief in prophecy-and-fulfillment
to the method of interpretation by which later events were seen not as fulfillments
in the strict sense of the word but as particular exempla illustrating a general bibli-
cal promise or warning.
PELIKAN, supra note 7, at 44. R
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the Constitution, but they would be treated as nullities when making
actual decisions.
For example, the principles underlying the Reconstruction
Amendments require equality for all American citizens.  The Constitu-
tion, however, through its eligibility requirements to hold certain fed-
eral offices, clearly limits the equality that is supposed to be extended
to citizens.  The eligibility requirements require that the President of
the United States be a natural born citizen, at least thirty-five years
old, and a resident of the United States for at least fourteen years.98
Those electoral qualifications could be reinterpreted in a “Christian”
constitutional regime.
Consider how the interpretive regime could be applied to resolve
an unclear legal issue, such as the one raised during the 2008 presi-
dential campaign regarding whether Senator John McCain is a natural
born citizen of the United States.99  The argument is that Senator Mc-
Cain is  not  a natural born citizen because he was born in the Panama
Canal Zone at a time when that territory was not clearly treated as
United States territory for purposes of birthright citizenship, and
when birth to United States citizens was not enough to make one a
natural born citizen.100  What it means to be a natural born citizen
would appear to be the relevant question. The interpretive regime
noted above, however, would require that the natural born require-
ment be interpreted in a way that would be consistent with the Recon-
struction Amendments’ equality principles.101  Thus, even if standard
interpretive methods would seem to conclude that Senator McCain is
not a natural born citizen, if that interpretation conflicted with equal-
ity principles, that interpretation would not control whether Senator
McCain would be eligible to serve as president.  This use of the Recon-
struction Amendments’ principles could be considered acceptable to
the extent that the principles could be deemed to have been used
merely to interpret ambiguous or unclear text.
Using the Reconstruction Amendments’ principles to trump
clear text would be far more controversial.  For example, assume the
nomination of a thirty-year-old for the presidency.  Given the constitu-
98. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
99. See Gabriel J. Chin, Commentary, Why Senator John McCain Cannot be President:
Eleven Months and a Hundred Yards Short of Citizenship, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1
(2008), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol107/chin.pdf, for a full
discussion of the issues.
100. Id. at 1–2.
101. Some view the requirements simply as undemocratic. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note
83, at 142–50 (criticizing the age, duration of citizenship, and residency requirements for R
holding congressional office).
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tional text regarding presidential qualifications, the proper question
would appear to be whether the nominee is younger than thirty-five
years of age.  If this is the question and the nominee is thirty years old,
no amount of interpretation would allow the nominee to prevail.102
Under the interpretive regime above, however, the question is
whether the result that flows from the application of the qualifications
text is consistent with the Reconstruction Amendments’ equality prin-
ciples.  If the answer is no, the nominee would be allowed to run and,
if elected, serve as president.  The age requirement would not necessa-
rily be excised from the Constitution.  Indeed, it might legitimately
guide decisions of citizens regarding whether to vote for the thirty-
year-old presidential candidate in the same way that biblical text that
is not taken literally may still be considered a basis for making a deci-
sion or for viewing the world.  The text would merely be unable to
serve as a basis for a legal challenge to the actual election of the presi-
dential candidate.
The examples above merely scratch the surface of the constitu-
tional text that could be ignored or heavily reinterpreted through the
vision of a type of constitutional interpretation noted above.  Cer-
tainly, this form of interpretation could devolve into a parlor game of
finding the constitutional provision one likes least and trying to excise
it or have it ignored.103  That is not the point of this exercise, however,
any more than the point to biblical interpretation is to create a similar
parlor game featuring biblical passages that its players do not like.
Rather, the point is to consider what a constitution, the Constitution
of the United States, really means.  If the Constitution is literally just a
mass of words that creates a government and governs those subject to
it based on its commands, so be it.  If, however, it is supposed to pro-
vide a way or vision of living, it should be made as consistent as possi-
ble with the way of living it embodies.  If that requires ignoring
particular passages that do not fit the way of living reflected in the
core of the document embodied in the Reconstruction Amendments,
so be it.
102. See Tribe, supra note 6, at 93 (suggesting that a faithful interpreter cannot find a R
way around some constitutional provisions such as “the rule that the president must be
thirty-five years of age”).
103. Of course, constitutional law scholars could spend a pleasant evening detailing the
Constitution’s deficiencies. See LEVINSON, supra note 83, at 167–68 (listing some of the R
Constitution’s “truly grievous defects”).
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V. CONCLUSION
The simple notion underlying the Christian constitutional inter-
pretation noted above is that the principles underlying the Constitu-
tion define who Americans are as a people.  In the same way that a
Christian biblical interpretation focuses on core biblical principles
and interprets that holy text through its core principles, a Christian
constitutional interpretation could proceed by discovering core con-
stitutional principles and applying those principles to that text.  That
clear text found its way into the Constitution is arguably an insuffi-
cient reason to use it as a rule of decision if it is not consistent with the
principles that illuminate the entire Constitution and reflect who
Americans are and who Americans want to be.  Some may deem the
Constitution and all of its clear text the full and only reflection of who
Americans are and who Americans want to be.  For those people and
maybe many others, this Christian constitutional interpretation would
be anathema.  Rather than looking for overarching principles, they
would focus on the meanings of specific clauses even if to the detri-
ment of a holistic interpretation of the document.  Nonetheless, theirs
is a faithful interpretation of the Constitution.  Others may prefer that
the Constitution—the foundational document of our federal govern-
ment and our liberty—be interpreted to reflect who Americans want
to be.  At the least, they may prefer that the Constitution reflect who
we want to be whenever the document’s text is used to resolve actual
disputes.
The Christian constitutional interpretation noted above would re-
quire a willingness to ignore clear constitutional text, coupled with
the willingness to interpret uncertain constitutional text through the
lens of core Reconstruction Amendment principles.  This is not sim-
ply about constitutional amendment outside of Article V or repeal by
implication or a somewhat aggressive results-driven interpretation of
the Constitution.104  A Christian constitutional interpretation is about
treating the Constitution as a text that must conform to American
principles already deeply embedded in the Constitution.  It could
help eliminate some of those constitutional stupidities a group of wise
professors once cataloged.105  The interpretive regime noted may be
impossible to achieve or simply unwise.  However, it is worthwhile to
consider in that it suggests an alternative, but faithful, interpretation
of the Constitution.
104. See id. at 22 (noting that some have argued that the Constitution has been radically
altered outside of the Article V amendment process).
105. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
